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“To the nation’s unions, [Labor Secretary] Solis’s prominent 
role at the multilateral talks is a hopeful sign that workplace 
issues are moving to the top of the international economic 
agenda.”1  
 
 “But if [Obama] gives in to one more union petition against 
China, he will sacrifice U.S. credibility as it seeks Beijing’s 
cooperation on many other areas on which the two sides are 
negotiating over disagreements, including better access to 
China’s market for American companies or regional security in 
Asia.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Labor unions are actively seeking to influence the enforcement and 
formation of U.S. trade policy.  In an effort to protect U.S. workers, labor 
unions are filing an increasing number of actions based on existing trade 
laws and agreements.  They are also very actively exerting pressure to add 
increased worker provisions in pending and future trade agreements.  Is it 
more than protectionist bravado?  The current Obama administration appears 
to be listening actively to labor concerns.  While campaigning for the 
presidency, candidate Barack Obama seemed to be in favor of free trade, 
understanding that American workers must adjust to global competition.  For 
example, in a speech to workers in Flint, Michigan, he stated:  
 There are some who believe that we must try to turn back the 
clock on this new world; that the only chance to maintain our 
living standards is to build a fortress around America; to stop 
trading with other countries, shut down immigration, and rely 
on old industries. . . . Not only is it impossible to turn back the 
tide of globalization, but efforts to do so can make us worse 
off.3  
                                                                                                                   
 1 Michael D. Goldhaber, Going Global, LAB. + EMP. AN AM. LAW SUPP., Spring 2010, at 8, 8.  
 2 Editorial, Obama’s Outsourced Trade Policy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Sept. 15, 2010, at 13. 
 3 Barack Obama, Presidential Candidate, Speech in Flint, Michigan (June 16, 2008), in THE 
BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: OBAMA AND BIDEN’S PLAN FOR AMERICA 6 (2008), available at http:// 
www.setav.org/ups/dosya/28460.pdf. 
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Later, Obama and Vice Presidential candidate Joseph Biden pledged to 
undertake a number of steps to open up foreign markets and support 
American jobs, including: “us[ing] trade agreements to spread good 
labor . . . standards around the world”; to “pressure the World Trade 
Organization to enforce trade agreements and stop countries from continuing 
unfair government subsidies to foreign exporters and nontariff barriers on 
U.S. exports”; to “work to ensure that China is no longer given a free pass to 
undermine U.S. workers”; and to “make enforcement the top priority of the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Office.”4  Obama campaigned on 
promises of free and fair trade, which would both open up markets and help 
U.S. workers learn to compete on a global level.  Unfortunately, when he 
took office, the country was in the midst of an economic crisis.5  
The trade agenda ostensibly took a back seat to the more pressing concern 
of economic recovery.  A key aspect of that recovery, however, is trade.  In 
the 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama launched his National 
Export Initiative, a plan to “double [U.S.] exports over the next five years, an 
increase that will support two million [new] jobs in America.”6  Speculation 
followed that labor unions were poised to have more political clout with the 
Obama administration.7  The political backlash against free trade fueled 
protectionist sentiment, which was undoubtedly exacerbated by the August 
2010 surge in the U.S. trade deficit to $46.3 billion, with a record-breaking 
$28 billion gap in trade with China.8  In September 2010, Public Citizen 
produced a report claiming that “analysis of the actual outcomes of past U.S. 
                                                                                                                   
 4 THE BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: OBAMA AND BIDEN’S PLAN FOR AMERICA, supra note 3; see 
generally Okezie Chukwumerije, Obama’s Trade Policy: Trends, Prospects, and Portends, 16 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39 (2009) (discussing Obama’s approach to free trade during 
his presidential campaign). 
 5 Lee Hudson Teslik, The U.S. Economic Stimulus Plan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 18, 
2009), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-economic-stimulus-plan/p18348 (“President Barack 
Obama took office in January 2009 facing the biggest global economic crisis since the Second 
World War.”). 
 6 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address 
(Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-state-union-address). 
 7 See, e.g., Goldhaber, supra note 1 (positing that unions, with newfound political clout, 
are aiming to link stricter labor standards to trade); Editorial, supra note 2 (suggesting that 
Obama may sacrifice U.S. credibility with China if he succumbs to union pressure); Elizabeth 
Williamson & Melanie Trottman, Obama Courts Labor Support for Trade Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 4, 2010, at A2 (discussing Obama’s promises to labor unions to “enforce a range of 
worker protections in new trade pacts in an effort to win labor’s support of a revised South 
Korea free-trade agreement”). 
 8 Christine Hauser, U.S. Trade Deficit with China Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, at B3. 
666   GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:663 
 
 
FTAs [free trade agreements] show that the growth of U.S. exports to 
countries that are not FTA partners is as much as double the growth of 
exports to U.S. FTA partners.”9  Unemployment and a fragile economy 
heightened fears, which manifested themselves in opposition to trade.  
The link between labor, trade, and the elections further crystallized on 
September 29, 2010, when the House passed the Currency Reform for Fair 
Trade Act (CRFTA).10  This Act was designed to give the President 
expanded authority to impose tariffs on a wide range of Chinese imports to 
the U.S.11  Following the vote, American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) President Richard Trumka declared, 
“[t]his November we will send a powerful message that we will support 
those who vote for an economy that works for everyone.”12  Labor union 
members comprise a significant “voting bloc of more than 17 million 
[voters].”13  According to exit polls, in 2008, “23% of the electorate were 
[from union] households.”14  Although it never became law, CRFTA 
embodied the heightened concern Congress and voters were feeling about 
trade, especially with China.15 
Then, in October 2010, a poll revealed that 53% of Americans “said free-
trade agreements have hurt the U.S.”16  Perhaps most surprising, however, 
was that the poll showed that “upper-income, well-educated 
                                                                                                                   
 9 TRAVIS MCARTHUR & TODD TUCKER, PUB. CITIZEN’S GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, LIES, 
DAMN LIES AND EXPORT STATISTICS: HOW CORPORATE LOBBYISTS DISTORT RECORD OF 
FLAWED TRADE DEALS 3 (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FTA%20Pen 
alty%20Paper%20FINAL1.pdf. 
 10 Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, H.R. 2378, 111th Cong. (2010).  The vote was 348–
79, with 99 Republicans voting in favor.  David E. Sanger & Sewell Chan, Eye on China, 
House Votes for Greater Tariff Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at B1.  As of October 13, 
2010, the Bill had been received in the Senate, read twice, and referred to the Committee on 
Finance; it was immediately met with mixed reactions.  Compare Donald L. Luskin, Op-Ed., 
The Trade and Tax Doomsday Clocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at A25 (arguing that the 
CRFTA has the potential to be dangerously protectionist), with Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., 
Taking On China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at A25 (asserting that the Bill is a positive step to 
deal with China). 
 11 H.R. 2378.  
 12 Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka on the 
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.aflcio.org/Pres 
s-Room/Press-Releases/Statement-by-AFL-CIO-President-Richard-Trumka-On-t21. 
 13 Melanie Trottman, Unions Make Vote Push, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at A6.  
 14 Id. 
 15 H.R. 2378. 
 16 Sara Murray & Douglas Belkin, Americans Sour on Trade, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at 
A1. 
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professionals . . . are increasingly skeptical [about free trade].”17  In the 2010 
mid-term elections, some Democrats blamed their Republican opponents for 
supporting free trade policies that have cost millions of Americans their 
jobs.18  In turn, this backlash against free trade prompted politicians from 
both parties to use “unfair trade” talking points.19  This general opposition to 
trade stalled ratification of the pending free trade agreements with Korea, 
Colombia, and Panama for another year.20  
To complicate the mix even further, the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA) program designed to help workers who lost their jobs due to the 
impact of international trade, expired in February 2011.21  The Obama 
Administration said that it would not submit the pending free trade 
agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama to Congress until there was 
agreement to renew the TAA.22  According to U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR), Ron Kirk, the “administration believes that just as we should be 
excited about the prospect of selling more of what we make around the 
world, we have to be equally firm about keeping faith with America’s 
workers.”23  The TAA has strong support from labor unions, especially from 
AFL-CIO President Trumka, who called the program “ ‘a lifeline for 
working people trying to get the skills necessary to change careers after their 
lives have been turned upside down.’ ”24  Understanding the political utility 
of the program, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also supports the TAA.25 
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)26 also expired in February 
2011.27  “The objective of the [ATPA] is to promote broad-based economic 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Id. 
 18 Thomas Fitzgerald, Democrats in Race See Free Trade as Fair Game, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Oct. 7, 2010, at A01.  
 19 Douglas A. Irwin, Goodbye, Free Trade?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2010, at C1.  
 20 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by U.S. Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk on Congressional Passage of Trade Agreements, Trade Adjustment 
Assistance and Key Preference Programs (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Kirk on Congressional 
Passage], available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/state 
ment-us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-congres. 
 21 Trade Act Program—Overview, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/progra 
moverview.cfm (last updated Feb. 11, 2011).  
 22 Binyamin Appelbaum, Ultimatum Holding Up Trade Deals, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, 
at B1. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Mike Hall, White House Says No Trade Deals Until TAA Strengthened, AFL-CIO NOW 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Economy/White-House-Says-No-Trade-Deals-U 
ntil-TAA-Strengthened. 
 25 Elizabeth Williamson, Trade Pacts Tied to Worker Aid, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2011, at A7. 
 26 Andean Trade Preference Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (codified in 
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development” and to help undermine drug trafficking “by providing 
sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production in beneficiary 
countries.”28  Senate Democrats will not support the ATPA until the TAA 
passes.29  Moreover, the extension of the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP),30 which expired in December 2010,31 has also been blocked, denying 
developing countries preferential access to U.S. markets.32  One last 
consideration is that there have been calls to renew the Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA or Fast-Track),33 which is not a priority for the Obama 
administration.34  Under the TPA, which was scheduled to expire in 2007,35 
Congress grants the President the authority to negotiate free trade agreements 
(subject to congressional rules), providing trade partners with assurance that 
“the final agreements will be given swift and unamended consideration.”36  
All of these trade issues are interrelated and steeped in politics.  The result 
was that the Obama Administration and Congress were at a significant set of 
interrelated impasses,37 until the passage of the three pending free trade 
agreements, as well as the TAA reforms, the GSP and ATPA in October 
2011.38 
                                                                                                                   
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (2010)). 
 27 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by USTR Ron Kirk on 
Need to Support American Workers by Extending Important Trade Programs (Feb. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Kirk on Need to Support], available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pr 
ess-releases/2011/february/statement-ustr-ron-kirk-need-support-american-wor. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Editorial, No Way to Run a Trade Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A26. 
 30 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006). 
 31 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www. 
ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp  
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012). 
 32 Kirk on Need to Support, supra note 27. 
 33 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3813 (2006). 
 34 Vicki Needham, Trade Deals Could Be Ready Next Week, ON THE MONEY: THE HILL’S FIN. 
& ECON. BLOG (June 16, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1005-trade/166997-trade-
deals-could-be-ready-next-week; see generally MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS22608, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) RENEWAL: CORE LABOR STANDARDS ISSUES: A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 1 (2007) (noting that within the debate about renewing the TPA is the issue of 
“whether to include enforceable core labor standards as a principal negotiating objective in trade 
agreements”). 
 35 BOLLE, supra note 34, at 1. 
 36 J.F. HORNBECK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33743, TRADE 
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY (2012). 
 37 See Editorial, supra note 29 (criticizing Republican lawmakers for blocking the TAA 
unless the White House promises to advance the Colombia FTA and Democratic lawmakers 
for refusing to support the ATPA until the TAA passes).  
 38 Kirk on Congressional Passage, supra note 20.  
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Although the U.S. international trade deficit in goods and services 
decreased in April 2011 to $43.2 billion,39 with nearly a $21.6 billion gap in 
trade with China,40 much work needs to be done to “rebuild the domestic 
consensus on trade.”41  To that end, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative is making it clear that “[u]nions, NGOs, and small businesses 
that have felt shut out of the trade policy process now have a seat at the 
table.”42  The prominence of labor is also evident in the President’s 2011 
Trade Policy Agenda (the Agenda).  The Agenda states: “We will continue to 
actively enforce U.S. rights under our trade agreements.  We will conduct 
these efforts based on high standards that reflect American values on labor 
and on the environment, and on public engagement and transparency.”43  The 
Agenda explicitly states that free trade agreement “labor obligations will be 
treated the same as commercial obligations and that the United States will 
expect our trading partners to meet their obligations on labor.”44  This 
emphasis on labor represents a significant and important shift in trade policy.  
It is against this backdrop that this research will analyze the influence of 
labor unions on U.S. trade policy.  The degree to which labor is influencing 
the U.S. trade agenda is central to this Article and its recommendations, 
which are divided into five areas of inquiry.  Part I reviews selected actions 
asserted by labor unions over the decade prior to the Obama Administration, 
with particular emphasis on the Bush Administration’s steel tariffs.  Part II 
analyzes two actions taken in 2009; one halting the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) plan to allow trucks from Mexico into the U.S., 
and a second that placed tariffs on tires imported from China.  This Part also 
incorporates the new trucking agreement that resolved he dispute with 
Mexico.  Part III considers the pending Dominican Republic-Central 
                                                                                                                   
 39 U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, 1992 - PRESENT, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/exhibit_history. 
pdf (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 40 TRADE IN GOODS WITH CHINA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trad 
e/balance/c5700.html (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 41 Demetrios J. Marantis, Ambassador & Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks at the 
University of Georgia: The Future of International Trade (Feb. 18, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2011/february/remarks-ambassad 
or-demetrios-marantis-unive). 
 42 Id. 
 43 RONALD KIRK, 2011 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 1 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 TRADE POLICY AGENDA], available at http://www. 
ustr.gov/webfm_send/2597. 
 44 Id. at 149. 
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America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) request for 
consultations with Guatemala for labor rights violations.  Part IV details the 
United Steel Workers Section 301 Action against China related to green 
technology industries.  Part V reviews the labor provisions in the recently 
ratified free trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama.  This 
Article evaluates the extent to which labor unions are driving U.S. trade 
policy under the Obama Administration, and, based on that investigation, 
Part VI considers the future of labor unions’ ability to balance domestic and 
international worker concerns with a forward-looking trade policy.45  
Ultimately, this Article argues for protection of workers from unfair 
competition and advocates for stronger measures in free trade agreements to 
improve labor practices and conditions for workers in other countries to 
ensure that they are consistent with fundamental labor rights. 
II.  BACKGROUND: ACTIONS ASSERTED BY LABOR UNIONS OVER THE LAST 
DECADE 
Selected actions asserted by labor unions over the decade prior to the 
Obama Administration provide the background for the current revitalization 
of labor’s involvement in trade.  On June 5, 2001, President George W. Bush 
asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to commence a 
Section 201 investigation.46  A Section 201 investigation is authorized under 
the Trade Act of 1974 to provide import relief to “facilitate a domestic 
industry’s positive adjustment to import competition,”47 or, in other words, to 
create a level trading field when a domestic industry is being injured due to 
                                                                                                                   
 45 See generally Christian Barry & Sanjay G. Reddy, International Trade and Labor 
Standards: A Proposal for Linkage, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545 (2006) (advocating for the 
improvement of working conditions and living standards in poor countries without imposing 
undue burdens); Kevin Kolben, A Development Approach to Trade and Labor Regimes, 45 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 356 (2010) (arguing for “an ‘Integrative Linkage’ approach to 
trade and labor regimes”); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The “Helping Hand” in Trade 
Agreements: An Analysis of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade 
Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004) (proposing a model for labor standards in free 
trade agreements); Andrea R. Schmidt, Note, A New Trade Policy for America: Do Labor and 
Environmental Provisions in Trade Agreements Serve Social Interests or Special Interests?, 
19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 167, 168 (2009) (using economic theory to assert “that labor 
and environmental standards in trade agreements are vulnerable to manipulation and 
exploitation by various protectionist groups”). 
 46 STEPHEN COONEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21152, STEEL: KEY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
1 (2002). 
 47 VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32371, TRADE REMEDIES: A PRIMER 19 
(2008). 
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an influx of imports.  The Bush Administration was responding to “requests 
from Congress, union representatives and steel companies” to investigate the 
effects of imported steel on the domestic industry.48  Bankruptcy filings by 
thirty-one steel firms, the idling of tens of thousands of workers, and falling 
steel prices (a twenty-year low) prompted the petition.49  Based on the 
information presented, the ITC ruled that steel imports were causing severe 
injury to the U.S. steel industry and that the President had the authority to 
proclaim import tariffs on foreign steel.50  Acting on this decision, the Bush 
Administration imposed 8% to 30% tariffs on steel imports, mostly against 
imports from the European Union, China, Japan, South Korea, and the 
former Soviet states.51  
This move was criticized severely for the overall detrimental effect on 
steel consumers in the U.S.,52 as well as the way in which the tariffs 
compromised international credibility on the U.S. commitment to free 
trade.53  Although steel mills added jobs, steel consumers shredded jobs 
because of the tariffs.54  In March 2002, the European Union requested 
consultations in the World Trade Organization (WTO).55  Shortly thereafter, 
China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland joined the 
European Union in challenging the steel tariffs as violating WTO rules,56 
prompting the Bush Administration to begin a series of exemptions for 
certain products in June 2002.57  Thereafter, on July 11, 2003, the WTO 
                                                                                                                   
 48 COONEY, supra note 46.  
 49 Impact of the Section 201 Safeguard Action on Certain Steel Products: Hearing Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 6, 1st Sess. 
(2003) (statement of Representative Sander M. Levin, Member, H. Subcomm. on Trade). 
 50 Steel, Inv. No. TA-201-73, USITC Pub. 3479 (Dec. 2001) (Final).  
 51 Press Release, George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Announces Temporary 
Safeguards for Steel Industry (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archiv 
es.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020305-6.html; Edward Gresser, Toughest on the Poor: 
America’s Flawed Tariff System, Foreign Aff., Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 9, 9.  
 52 Mike Allen & Jonathan Weisman, Steel Tariffs Appear to Have Backfired on Bush, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at A01.  
 53 Kevin K. Ho, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs, 21 BERK. J. INT’L 
L. 825, 827 (2003).  
 54 Allen & Weisman, supra note 52.  
 55 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/1 (Mar. 7, 2002). 
 56 Procedural Agreement Between the United States and China, et al., United States – 
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/13 (July 15, 
2002). 
 57 Steel Tariffs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2002), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/sto 
ry.php?storyId=1144560. 
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ruled that the U.S.-imposed steel tariffs were illegal.58  Despite this ruling, 
President Bush preserved the tariffs.59  On September 19, 2003, the ITC 
submitted its midterm report to the White House, presenting three options: 
continue the existing safeguards, modify the safeguards, or lift the safeguards 
altogether.60  United Steel Workers (USW) contended that the steel tariffs 
were working as designed and should be continued.61  In November 2003, 
however, the WTO Appellate Body confirmed that each of the safeguard 
measures were in violation of WTO rules.62  On December 4, 2003, President 
Bush signed a proclamation ending the safeguards.63 
These politically motivated tariffs injured American businesses, workers, 
and consumers who relied on foreign steel.  This action was viewed as 
forsaking free trade principles to aid steel mills in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia—“two states crucial for [Bush’s] reelection.”64  Karl Rove was an 
advocate of the tariffs for strategic political purposes.65  Even U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick admitted that politics was behind the steel 
tariffs: “[W]e have to manage political support for free trade at 
home . . . . [W]e have to create coalitions.”66  Any short-term protectionist 
advantage for the U.S. steel industry was undercut by the overall harm.  
Anticipating that perhaps the steel tariffs signaled the Bush 
Administration’s willingness to cooperate with labor about their concerns 
with global competition, the AFL-CIO filed two petitions.67  First, in 2004, 
the AFL-CIO filed the first workers’ rights case against the Chinese 
government, contending that exploitation of Chinese workers created unfair 
competition.68  Specifically, the petition was based on Section 301 of the 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products, WT/DS248/R (July 11, 2003). 
 59 Restructuring American Steel: Safeguard Tariffs and the Politics of Unfair Trade, UNITED 
STEEL WORKERS (Sept. 25, 2003), http://www.usw.org/our_union/workplaces?id=0004. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Press Release No. 69/03, European Union, EU Welcomes WTO Ruling Confirming US 
Steel Tariffs Are Illegal (Nov. 10, 2003), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/20 
03/2003069.htm. 
 63 Proclamation No. 7741, 68 Fed. Reg. 235 (Dec. 8, 2003); Press Release, George W. 
Bush, U.S. President, President’s Statement on Steel (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://Georg 
ewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-5.html. 
 64 Allen & Weisman, supra note 52. 
 65 Editorial, Steel Thyself, Karl Rove, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A12. 
 66 Jennifer L. Rich, U.S. Admits That Politics Was Behind Steel Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2002, at W1. 
 67 See Paul Blustein, Labor Seeks Pressure on China, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at E03. 
 68 See id. 
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Trade Act of 197469 and alleged unfair trade practices by the Chinese 
government.70  Six weeks later, four Bush Administration cabinet members 
held a press conference to reject the petition.71  Inasmuch as there was no 
meaningful change for Chinese workers over the next two years, the AFL-
CIO submitted a new petition to the White House in 2006, alleging violations 
of workers’ rights by suppressing strikes, banning independent unions, and 
permitting factories to violate minimum wage and child labor laws.72  On 
July 21, 2006, the White House rejected the second petition.73  At that point, 
it was relatively clear that the Bush Administration was not interested in 
pursuing these kinds of unfair trade actions against China.  The landscape for 
labor, however, shifted with the Obama Administration.  
III.  MEXICAN TRUCKS AND CHINESE TIRES 
Two key actions in 2009, one involving trucks entering the U.S. from 
Mexico and the other tires imported from China, provided an early indication 
of the Obama Administration’s receptiveness to positions advocated by labor 
groups.  In the case of the Mexican trucks, pursuant to obligations under 
NAFTA, the U.S. initiated the Cross-Border Demonstration Project in 2007 
for one year.74  The program allowed a limited number of Mexican trucks to 
deliver goods within the U.S.,75 as opposed to handing over the goods to U.S. 
truckers at the border.  In the spring of 2008, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation issued an Interim Report concluding that the low number of 
carriers participating in the program was insufficient to determine reliably 
                                                                                                                   
 69 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006). 
 70 Press Release, AFL-CIO, Bush Administration Officially Rejects AFL-CIO Section 301 
Trade Petition (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Press-Release 
s/Bush-Administration-Officially-Rejects-AFL-CIO-Sec. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO Secr’y-Treasurer Trumka on Bush 
Administration’s Rejection of 301 Petition Against Chinese Government (July 21, 2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 Rejection of 301 Petition], available at http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Pre 
ss-Releases/Statement-by-AFL-CIO-Secretary-Treasurer-Trumka-on; see generally THOMAS 
LUM & DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31403, CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE WORLD (2007) (detailing the surge in imports from China, including the threat 
posed to U.S. industries and manufacturing employment). 
 73 2006 Rejection of 301 Petition, supra note 72. 
 74 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Office of Inspector Gen., Statement on 
Announcement of Cross-Border Truck Safety Pilot Plan 1 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http:// 
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/DOT_OIG_Stmt_Ltrhead2.pdf. 
 75 Id.  
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the safety of Mexican carriers.76  Then, the project was extended in August 
2008 for two additional years.77  
With the enthusiastic support of the U.S. Teamsters Union, however, the 
2009 appropriations bill blocked funding for the pilot program.78  Signing the 
bill prohibited the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration from using 
appropriated funds to continue the project,79 thus killing the program.  In 
March 2009, Mexico immediately retaliated by placing $2.4 billion in tariffs 
on about ninety U.S. products imported into Mexico.80  In August 2010, 
Mexico followed up with an expanded list of U.S. goods subject to tariffs, 
including some U.S. pork and cheese products, as well as chewing gum, 
ketchup, and corn.81  The tariffs were selected to affect products from regions 
throughout the U.S.82  The dispute placed President Obama in a difficult 
position.83  The tariffs were counterproductive to his goal of doubling exports 
from the U.S.84  On the other hand, given the opposition of labor groups to 
any trucking program, he was at risk of alienating key union support in the 
midst of the midterm elections.85 
Well after the mid-term elections and well before the next major election 
cycle, President Obama and Mexican President Calderon announced they 
had reached an agreement resolving the cross-border trucking dispute.86  
Pursuant to the March 2011 plan, half of the tariffs on U.S. goods were to be 
lifted immediately. The remaining tariffs are to be lifted when the first 
Mexican carrier receives authorization to truck goods into the U.S. pursuant 
to the new program.87  Thereafter, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
                                                                                                                   
 76 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INTERIM REPORT ON NAFTA 
CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 3 (2008), http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/ 
files/pdfdocs/Interim_NAFTA_Report_with_508.pdf. 
 77 Notice of Extension of Demonstration Project on NAFTA Trucking Provisions, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 45,796 (Aug. 6, 2008). 
 78 Notice of Termination of Demonstration Project on NAFTA Trucking Provisions, 74 
Fed. Reg. 11,628 (Mar. 18, 2009). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Mexico: Tariffs Placed on U.S. Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at B10. 
 81 Scott Horsley, Mexico Slaps Tariffs on U.S. Products in Truck Dispute (National Public 
Radio broadcast Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=129282803. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 85 Horsley, supra note 81. 
 86 Elizabeth Williamson, U.S., Mexico Agree to Settle Truck Feud, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 
2011, at A1. 
 87 Id. 
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Administration requested public comment on the details of the agreement.88  
The two key features under the new pilot program are that (1) Mexico-
domiciled motor carriers are allowed to operate in the U.S. for up to three 
years (with reciprocal rights for U.S.-domiciled motor carriers); and (2) 
“Mexican carriers and drivers [are] required to comply with all applicable 
U.S. laws and regulation,” including those pertaining to safety, registration, 
taxation and immigration.89  More specifically, the process for applying for 
participation in the pilot program begins with a twenty-eight page application 
that gathers specific information about the carrier, its affiliations, its 
insurance, its safety programs, and its compliance with U.S. laws.90  In 
addition to providing general information, the carrier must complete up to 
thirty-five safety and compliance certifications and provide information 
regarding its systems for monitoring hours of service and crashes and 
complying with Department of Transportation (DOT) drug and alcohol 
testing requirements.91  
The proposal is designed to be a rigorous process to ensure the safety of 
Mexican trucks on U.S. highways.  The current plan contains more safety 
requirements than the previous program.92  For example, the current program 
requires that “Mexican trucks undergo a ‘full inspection’ ” (as opposed to 
being merely “checked”) to determine if “the carrier ha[s] passed a pre-
authority safety audit . . . and whether the driver ha[s] a valid license and [is] 
proficient in English.”93 
During the public comment period, a bipartisan group of forty-four 
members of Congress joined together in a letter to the DOT to express 
concerns over the agreement, particularly road safety and border security 
breaches.94  The letter concludes by strongly opposing the proposal and 
stating that the “current system of Mexican carriers operating within a 
defined commercial zone is working well for both safety and border 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Request for Comment Pilot Program on NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, 77 
Fed. Reg. 40,938–41 (July 11, 2011).  
 89 Id. 
 90 FMCSA Proposes Details of Mexico Trucking Pilot Program, TRUCKINGINFO (Apr. 12, 
2011), http://www.truckinginfo.com/news/news-detail.asp?news_id=73510. 
 91 Id. 
 92 JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41821, STATUS OF MEXICAN TRUCKS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2011). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Letter from Duncan Hunter et al., Member of Congress, U.S., to Ray LaHood, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp. (May 4, 2011), available at http://hunter.house.gov/images/stories/HunterLipi 
nski_Trucking_Letter.pdf. 
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security.”95  Not surprisingly, the Teamsters also oppose the proposed plan.96  
According to Teamsters General President Jimmy Hoffa, the proposal “fails 
to adequately protect our members, their families and the traveling public 
from the potential danger of unsafe Mexican trucks and drivers, who do not 
meet or will not adhere to all U.S. safety standards.”97  The Teamsters urged 
the Obama Administration to challenge the tariffs imposed by Mexico 
instead of negotiating a trucking program.98  Similarly, the Owner-Operated 
Independent Drivers Association (OODIA) maintained that the tariffs should 
be challenged and that the “administration’s failure to challenge those tariffs 
has jeopardized the livelihoods of millions of truckers and other 
Americans.”99   
Inasmuch as the U.S. is required under NAFTA to allow the trucks into 
the U.S.,100 this alternative approach was not reasonable.  Mexico was 
exercising its right to impose retaliatory tariffs, not “harass[ing] [the U.S.] 
into lowering [safety] standards, as alleged by the OODIA.”101  The public 
comment period closed in May 2011102 amidst ongoing concern that the 
three-year pilot program will result in U.S. drivers losing their jobs—the real 
issue fueling opposition to the program.103 
In July 2011, the U.S. and Mexico signed a new trucking deal, with both 
countries agreeing to drop their trade barriers for a three-year trial period.104  
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. 
 96 Hoffa: The Public Opposes Illegal, Unsafe Mexican Truck Program, TEAMSTERS (May 16, 
2011), http://www.teamster.org/content/hoffa-public-opposes-illegal-unsafe-mexican-truck-prog 
ram. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. 
 99 Press Release, Owner-Operated Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Truckers Outraged: U.S. & Mexico 
Trucking Agreement (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.ooida.com/MediaCenter/Press_Rel 
eases/pressrelease.asp?prid=189. 
 100 In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-
01, Final Report of the NAFTA Arbitral Panel (2001), http://registry.nafta-sec-alena.org/cmdocu 
ments/8f70c18a-7f02-4126-96f6-182a11c90517.pdf. 
 101 Press Release, supra note 99. 
 102 Request for Comment Pilot Program on NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 40,980; see also Pilot Program on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.fmcsa.dot 
gov/rules-regulations/administration/rulemakings/notices/US-MX-agreement-FR-notice.aspx  
(last visited May 2, 2012). 
 103 See, e.g., FRITTELLI, supra note 92, at 6–7 (describing opposition from the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters and independent owner-operator truck drivers).  
 104 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation of the United 
States of America and the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes of the United Mexican 
States on International Freight Cross-Border Trucking Services art. 2, U.S.-Mex., July 6, 2011, 
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Pursuant to the Agreement, Mexican carriers are now able to apply for 
permits to allow them to drive their trucks in the U.S.105  Significantly, 
Mexico agreed to drop 50% of its retaliatory tariffs within ten days of 
signing the agreement, with a complete suspension of all tariffs as soon as 
the first Mexican carrier is granted authority, provisional or full, under the 
trucking agreement.106  “Mexican tariffs [currently] range from five to 25 
percent on . . . U.S. products such as apples, certain pork products, and 
personal care goods.”107  Following seventeen years of dispute over this 
trucking issue, and billions of dollars in punitive tariffs imposed against 
Mexico by the United States,108 the U.S. and Mexico finally appear to have a 
trucking pilot program in place that balances safety concerns with the rights 
of Mexican truckers under NAFTA.  
The second major trade-related action by the Obama Administration in 
2009 involved an April petition by the United Steel Workers (USW).  Filed 
under Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974, the petition’s subject was tires 
imported from China.109  The International Trade Commission subsequently 
determined that certain tires from China were “being imported into the 
United States in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like 
or directly competitive products.”110  The ITC proposed imposing duties on 
all such tires for a three-year period.111  At that time, President Obama had 
the authority to make the final decision.112  Despite international opposition, 
                                                                                                                   
available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/Mexican_MOU_Eng.pdf. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Letter from Miriam Sapiro, U.S. Ambassador, to Beatriza Leycegui Gardoqui, Undersec’y 
for Int’l Trade for Mex. (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2959. 
 107 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk: Mexico to Drop 
Retaliatory Tariffs by Fifty Percent (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2011/july/ustr-kirk-friday-mexico-drop-retaliatory-tariffs-fift.  
 108 Williamson, supra note 86.   
 109 Press Release, United Steel Workers, USW Seeks Relief from Flood of Imported Chinese 
Tires (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/releases_advisories?id= 
0155. 
 110 Press Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, USITC Announces Determination I China 
Safeguard Investigation Concerning Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires (June 
18, 2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2009/er0618gg1.htm; 
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China, Inv. No. TA-421-7, USITC 
Pub. 4085 (July 2009) (Final) [hereinafter Certain Passenger Vehicle Decision]. 
 111 Certain Passenger Vehicle Decision, supra note 110, at 1. 
 112 Id. at 30. 
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the President announced that the U.S. would levy tariffs up to 35% on tires 
imported from China.113  
Outside of limited labor circles, the decision was immediately met with 
worldwide criticism calling the measures unfairly protectionist.114  Ironically, 
the Tire Industry Association (TIA) in the U.S. opposed the tariffs, 
expressing concerns that they would result in substantial job losses and 
increased costs to consumers.115  China immediately alleged protectionism 
and responded by calling for talks with the U.S. at the WTO.116  China 
challenged the U.S. measures restricting imports on certain Chinese tires and 
requested the WTO establish a panel to determine the measures’ consistency 
with WTO obligations.117  The U.S. maintained the measures were necessary 
safeguards, noting that “in just four years, U.S. tyre imports from China 
more than tripled in volume and the value of the imports rose to USD 1.8 
billion. . . . [while U.S. production fell] by 25 per cent, [and] 14 per cent of 
US workers in the industry had lost their jobs.”118  
In December 2010, the WTO upheld the validity of the tariffs, finding 
that “in imposing the transitional safeguards measure . . . the United States 
did not fail to comply with its [WTO] obligations.”119  The U.S. responded 
by calling the decision “a major victory for the United States and particularly 
for American workers and businesses. . . . [T]his outcome demonstrates that 
the Obama Administration is strongly committed to using and defending our 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Kirk: White House Fulfilling 
Trade Enforcement Pledge with Announcement of Remedies in Chinese Tire Case (Sept. 11, 
2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/September/ 
kirk-white-house-fulfilling-trade-enforcement-pl. 
 114 See, e.g., Daniel Ikenson, Burning Rubber: Proposed Duties on Chinese Tires Whiff of 
Senseless Protectionism (Free Trade Bull., No. 39, Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www. 
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/FTB-039.pdf (contending the duties are a protectionist 
response to “Big Labor”). 
 115 Press Release, Tire Indus. Ass’n, Tire Industry Association Expresses Disappointment 
with President’s Decision Concerning Chinese Tire Tariff (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http:// 
forms.tireindustry.org/news.asp. 
 116 Zhu Shaobin & Ma Shukun, China: U.S. Tire Tariff Sends “Wrong Signal” to World, 
XINHUANET (Sept. 13, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/13/content_12043010. 
htm. 
 117 DSB Sets up Panels on US – Tyres (China) and Philippines – Taxes on Spirits, Adopts 
Reports on China – Publications and AV Products, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/dsb_19jan10_e.htm. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle 
and Light Truck Tyres From China, at 113, WT/DS399/R (Dec. 13, 2010). 
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trade remedy laws to address harm to our workers and industries.”120  
Likewise, the decision was an important victory for the USW, which 
announced that it planned to “continue working with the administration to 
take full advantage of all enforcement tools available . . . so that the benefits 
of fair trade are made available to all Americans.”121 
In March 2011, the TIA renewed its opposition to the tariffs, stating that 
the “petition was not filed by the manufacturers suffering from a ‘market 
disruption;’ it was a disaffected union.”122  The TIA is trying to persuade 
Congress to monitor the following areas to determine the effect of the tariffs:  
U.S. production of consumer tires (including production of 
private brands and other entry-level tires), changes in 
employment at U.S. tire production facilities, changes in 
consumer tire imports from countries other than China, retail 
price trends for domestic and imported tires (including specific 
price trends in low-income areas of the United States), and 
changes in employment levels in the tire distribution and retail 
sectors.123  
The TIA continues to actively oppose the tariffs.124  On May 24, 2011, China 
notified the WTO “of its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain 
issues of law and legal interpretation covered in the [WTO] panel report.”125  
In both the Chinese and Mexican cases, President Obama’s actions 
largely were consistent with the position advocated by certain domestic labor 
groups.  Both actions, however, were met by domestic and international 
criticism, suggesting that the U.S. stance was motivated by protectionism and 
short-term politics.  Although President Obama may have garnered support 
                                                                                                                   
 120 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Prevails in WTO  
Section 421 Safeguard Dispute with China (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ab  
out-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/december/united-states-prevails-wto-section-421-safegu 
ard.  
 121 Press Release, Leo W. Gerard, President, United Steel Workers, USW President Gerard 
Statement: U.S. Prevails Before WTO in China Challenge of Tire Trade Case (Dec. 13, 2010), 
available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/releases_advisories?id=0347. 
 122 Press Release, Tire Indus. Ass’n, Chinese Tire Tariff (Mar. 2011), available at http:// 
www.tireindustry.org/default.aspx?id=1598. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. (indicating no change in the TIA’s stance on the Chinese tire tariff issue). 
 125 United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light 
Truck Tyres from China, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/c 
ases_e/ds399_e.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2011). 
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from selected vocal labor groups, his initial position on the Mexican trucks 
and his support of the tire tariffs belied a commitment to free trade. 
IV.  CAFTA-DR: ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR PROVISIONS 
A key focus of the Bush Administration was negotiating a number of free 
trade agreements, including CAFTA-DR, which was ratified in 2005.126  One 
of the most contentious issues was the opposition of labor to the 
agreement.127  Many people believed that the labor provisions were not 
adequate to protect U.S. workers.128  In fact, Barack Obama, as a junior 
senator from Illinois, opposed CAFTA-DR because it did “less to protect 
labor than previous trade agreements.”129  Acknowledging that “[t]he 
question is not whether we can stop [globalization], but how we respond to 
it,” Senator Obama asserted that it is “not whether we should protect our 
workers from competition, but what we can do to fully enable them to 
compete against workers all over the world.”130  Now, as President, he is in 
the position of enforcing the CAFTA-DR provisions.  
Overall, the CAFTA-DR labor provisions fall short of offering any 
significant protection for workers, both in the U.S. and other member 
countries.131  Although the parties agree to “strive to ensure” that the labor 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004 
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreem 
ents/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; Press Release, George W. Bush, 
U.S. President, President Signs CAFTA-DR (Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-wh 
itehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html. 
 127 See, e.g., Lionel Beehner, Q&A: The CAFTA Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2005), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_071805.html?pagewanted=print (detailing opposition 
from organized labor and workers’ rights groups).   
 128 See, e.g., Kathy Schalch, CAFTA Encounters Opposition from Labor (National Public 
Radio broadcast May 28, 2005) (describing opposition from labor groups alleging that 
workers’ rights are routinely abused in CAFTA-DR countries). 
 129 Op-Ed., Barack Obama, Why I Oppose CAFTA, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2005, at 27. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in CAFTA, 29 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 386, 432–39 (2005).  For a critique of the adequacy of the labor chapter 
in CAFTA-DR, see generally Paula Church Albertson, The Evolution of Labor Provisions in 
U.S. Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned and Remaining Questions Examining the 
Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), 
21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 493 (2010); Lyndsay D. Speece, Comment, Beyond Borders: 
CAFTA’s Role in Shaping Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements, 37 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1101 (2007); Brandie Ballard Wade, Comment, CAFTA-DR Labor Provisions: Why 
They Fail Workers and Provide Dangerous Precedent for the FTAA, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. 
AMERICAS 645 (2007). 
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principles in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (ILO 
Declaration), as well as “internationally recognized labor rights . . . are 
recognized and protected by its law,”132 this is an aspirational goal, not a 
mandatory one.  Pursuant to the labor provisions in CAFTA-DR, each 
member country (Party) pledged to “not fail to effectively enforce its [own] 
labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a 
manner affecting trade between the Parties. . . .”133  The Parties, however, 
“retai[n] the right to exercise discretion” with respect to investigating, 
prosecuting, regulating, and complying with “other labor matters determined 
to have higher priorities.”134  
If a Party believes that a violation of the Labor Chapter (Chapter 16) 
exists, it may request “consultations” by submitting a written request135 
containing “information that is specific and sufficient to enable the [alleged 
offending Party] to respond.136  The Parties are then to make “every attempt 
to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution”137 within sixty days of the 
request.138 If the Parties are unable to resolve the matter, then either Party 
“may request that the Council be convened to consider the matter. . . .”139  At 
such a proceeding, the Council may consult with “outside experts.”140  
Failure by a Party to enforce its own labor laws can subject the Party to 
binding dispute settlement and, ultimately, fines or sanctions.141  The 
                                                                                                                   
 132 CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 16.1(1). CAFTA-DR defines “internationally 
recognized labor rights” as  
(a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; 
(d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and 
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health. 
Id. art. 16.8. 
 133 Id. art. 16.2(1)(a). 
 134 Id. art. 16.2(1)(b).  
 135 Id. art. 16.6(1). 
 136 Id. art. 16.6(2). 
 137 Id. art. 16.6(3). 
 138 Id. art. 16.6(6). 
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maximum fine is set at USD 15 million per year, per violation.142  The fines, 
however, do not get paid to the injured Party—instead they may be directed 
toward remedying the labor violation.143  Although the labor provisions are 
more “robust” than earlier free trade agreements,144 they do not require full 
incorporation of ILO standards.145  
The following sections consider the merits of the current CAFTA-DR 
requests for consultations with Guatemala regarding labor rights violations 
and possible action against Costa Rica.  
A.  Guatemala 
Even before CAFTA-DR was ratified, it was well known that labor 
activists are targets for attacks and threats in Guatemala.146  Additionally, 
violations, including of the right to association, the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, and the prohibitions on 
child labor, were all documented by the U.S. Department of State.147  Nearly 
two years after CAFTA-DR went into effect, reports of labor violations in 
Guatemala persisted; the director of the Commission for the Verification of 
Codes of Conduct, the “Guatemalan group hired by multinational companies 
to inspect local factories,” was quoted as stating, “[t]he law hasn’t been 
reformed, and people just don’t obey the law.  There’s a culture of 
impunity.”148  Further underscoring this sentiment, the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) produced a March 2008 report detailing trade 
union rights violations, including violence against union organizers, 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Id. art. 20.17(2). 
 143 Id. art. 20.17(4) 
 144 William (Bud) Clatanoff, Labor Standards in Recent U.S. Trade Agreements, 5 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 109, 114 (2005).  For an elaboration, see Pagnattaro, supra note 131, at 
432–39 (detailing how CAFTA fails to measure up to certain international negotiation 
objectives). 
 145 See discussion infra Parts V, VI. 
 146 Pagnattaro, supra note 131, at 416.  In 2006, CAFTA-DR entered into force in Guatemala.  
CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominic 
an-republic-central-america-fta (last visited May 21, 2012). 
 147 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA: 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2004, sec. 6(a) (2005), available at http:// 
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41762.htm. 
 148 Peter S. Goodman, Labor Rights in Guatemala Aided Little by Trade Deal, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 16, 2007, at A1. 
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discrimination, harsh working conditions, violence against women, and 
problems with child labor.149 
In April 2008, the AFL-CIO, along with six Guatemalan unions, filed a 
submission, referred to as Submission 2008-01 (Guatemala), with the U.S. 
Department of Labor alleging Guatemala’s systematic failure to enforce its 
labor laws and its failure to take reasonable action to prevent violence 
against trade unionists.150  The petition includes details of five individual 
cases, including the assassination of the General Secretary for STEPQ 
(Union of Port Quetzal Company Workers); the murder of a union officer for 
SITRABI (Union of Izabal Banana Workers); the failure to enforce labor 
laws and the refusal to bargain with the legally recognized union, 
SITRAINPROCSA (Union of International Frozen Products, Inc. Workers); 
the dismissal and blacklisting of worker representatives of the Coalition of 
Avandia Workers; and the dismissal of workers participating in or supporting 
a SITRAFRIBO (Union of Fribo Company Workers) union drive.151  The 
Annex to Submission 2008-01 (Guatemala) contains additional cases of 
violence, occurring primarily in 2008, including allegations of murder, 
shootings, harassment, and gang rape.152  Later in 2008, the Solidarity 
Center, a nonprofit organization established to provide assistance to workers 
seeking to unionize, produced a 118-page report setting forth the 
discouraging labor conditions, including violence against workers, violations 
of basic workers’ rights, discrimination, child labor, and abuse of migrant 
workers.153 
Despite mounting evidence of egregious labor conditions in Guatemala, 
the Bush Administration took no action.  In January 2009, the U.S. 
Department of Labor published a report of its review of Submission 2008-01 
(Guatemala).154  The report details violence against trade unionists and 
                                                                                                                   
 149 GUATEMALA: TRADE UNIONS AT THE HEART OF THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY, INT’L 
TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (2008), available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/VS_Gu 
atemala_EN.pdf.  
 150 AFL-CIO et al., Public Submission Concerning the Failure of the Government of 
Guatemala to Effectively Enforce Its Labor Laws and Comply with Its Commitments Under 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (2008), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/GuatemalaSubmission2008.pdf.  
 151 Id. at 2–3.  
 152 Id. at 24. 
 153 SOLIDARITY CTR., JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA 
(2008), available at http://www.solidaritycenter.org/files/pubs_guatemala_wr.pdf. 
 154 OFFICE OF TRADE & LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF 
OFFICE OF TRADE AND LABOR AFFAIRS U.S. SUBMISSION 2008-01 (GUATEMALA) (2009), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/otla/20090116Guatemala.pdf. 
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mistreatment of workers in Guatemala, including unlawful dismissal and 
refusal to pay legal severance.155  Inasmuch as the Guatemalan government 
and President Álvaro Colom were demonstrating a willingness to discuss the 
issues raised in the submission, “the OTLA [did] not recommend requesting 
consultations pursuant to . . . CAFTA-DR.”156  Thereafter, an eleven-month 
in-house examination concluded that Guatemala did not uphold its 
obligations to ensure the freedom of assembly, right to collective bargaining, 
right to organize, and decent work conditions.157  This was further 
corroborated by an ITUC survey discussing sixteen union-related murders in 
Guatemala in 2009158 and the 2009 Guatemala Country Report by the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S. State Department 
(Country Report).159  According to the Country Report, a wide variety of 
serious problems persist in Guatemala, including killings of trade unionists, 
discrimination, and “ineffective enforcement of labor laws and child labor 
provisions.”160 
In July 2010, the Obama Administration responded by requesting 
pursuant to CAFTA-DR consultations with the Guatemalan government to 
address workers’ rights violations.161  The U.S. announced that it was 
committed to “using every option available in the trade enforcement 
playbook to help sustain jobs here in America.”162  In a speech delivered at 
                                                                                                                   
 155 Id. at 5–28.  
 156 Id. at vi.  
 157 The results of this investigation have not been made public.  Interview with Laura Buffo, 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Sept. 15, 2010). 
 158 ITUC Annual Survey: 101 Trade Unionists Murdered in 2009; Pressure on Workers’ 
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 161 Letter from Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, & Hilda L. Solis, U.S. Sec’y of Lab., 
to Erick Haroldo Coyoy Echeverría, Guat.Minister of Econ., & Edgar Alfredo Rodríguez, 
Guat. Minister of Lab. & Soc. Prot.. (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm 
_send/2114; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis 
Announces Labor Consultation with Guatemala Under CAFTA-DR Agreement (July 30, 
2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20101078.htm#UPYhoB1 
QWSo.  
 162 Ron Kirk, Tough Trade Enforcement Supports Jobs for American Workers, WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (July 30, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/30/tough-trade-enfor 
cement-supports-jobs-american-workers. 
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Allegheny Technologies in Pennsylvania, USTR Ron Kirk discussed the 
Guatemala action, stating that 
[W]ith this case, we are sending a strong message that our 
trading partners must protect their own workers, that the 
Obama Administration will not tolerate labor violations that 
place U.S. workers at a disadvantage, and that we are prepared 
to enforce the full spectrum of American trade rights from 
labor to the environment.163 
The AFL-CIO applauded the decision to pursue labor consultations with 
Guatemala, stating it signaled “the strong commitment of the Obama 
Administration’s to enforcing our trade laws, including the obligation to 
respect workers’ rights.”164  Similarly, labor groups in Guatemala supported 
the U.S. action.165  Guatemalan apparel and textile producers, however, were 
concerned about the decision to pursue labor violations, being unsure of the 
ramifications.166  In 2009, Guatemala exported eleven billion dollars in 
apparel to the U.S.167 
Pursuant to the CAFTA-DR dispute resolution procedures,168 the Parties 
then attempted to resolve the dispute within sixty days.169  Confidential 
consultations were held on September 8–9, 2010, and Guatemala allegedly 
provided information about enforcement of its labor laws while also 
                                                                                                                   
 163 Ron Kirk, U.S. Ambassador, Remarks on Enforcement at Allegheny Technologies, Inc. 
(July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Allegheny Technologies] (transcript available at http://www.ustr. 
gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2010/july/remarks-ambassador-ron-kirk-enforce 
ment-alleghn). 
 164 Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka on 
Announcement of Guatemala Labor Rights Case (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.aflcio. 
org/index.php/Press-Room/Press-Releases/Statement-by-AFL-CIO-President-Richard-Trumka- 
on-A. 
 165 Four Years After CAFTA-DR: A Coup and Incessant Violence Against Workers, U.S. 
LAB. EDUC. IN THE AMERICAS PROJECT, Summer 2010, at 4, available at http://usleap.org/file 
s/newsletters/Summer2010.pdf. 
 166 Deborah Belgum, Guatemala Reacts to Allegations of Labor Violations, APPARELNEWS.NET 
(Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.apparelnews.net/news/international/081310-Guatemala-Reacts-to-All 
egations-of-Labor-Violations. 
 167 Id. 
 168 CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 16.6(6). 
 169 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk Announces Labor  
Rights Trade Enforcement Case Against Guatemala (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.us 
tr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/july/united-states-trade-representative-kirk-ann  
ounces-lab. 
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recognizing that cooperative activities between the two countries must be 
strengthened.170  Guatemala also reported that it shared information about the 
plan, established since President Colom took office in 2008, related to the 
actions that must be undertaken to strengthen Guatemala’s labor 
framework.171  
The sixty-day consultation period passed without any resolution.  On May 
16, 2011, the U.S. requested a meeting of the Free Trade Commission, 
pursuant to CAFTA-DR dispute resolution procedures.172  According to 
USTR Kirk, “[the U.S. has] identified a significant number of apparent 
failures by the Government of Guatemala to enforce its labor laws.  While 
Guatemala has taken some positive steps over the past several months, its 
actions and proposals have been insufficient to address what we view as 
systemic failures.”173  “This is the first labor case ever brought by the United 
States against a [free] trade agreement partner.”174  The USW expressed 
“strong support” for this enforcement action.175 
If a dispute resolution panel finds that Guatemala has failed to enforce 
effectively its labor laws, it may impose an annual monetary assessment of 
up to USD fifteen million dollars, adjusted for inflation.176  This is a very 
interesting test case.  On the one hand, reports indicate that the labor 
violations are, in fact, systemic and, by virtue of the level of violence, very 
troubling.177  On the other hand, the dispute mechanism and remedies 
provided for under CAFTA-DR could be much more rigorous.  It is 
especially regrettable that there is a cap on damages and that labor violations 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Press Release, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, Comunicado de Prensa 
Sobre las Consultas Cooperativas Ministeriales de Conformidad con el Capitulo 16 del DR-
CAFTA (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.minex.gob.gt/noticias/Noticia.aspx?id=468.  
 171 Id. 
 172 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk Seeks Enforcement 
of Labor Laws in Guatemala (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pres 
s-office/press-releases/2011/may/ustr-kirk-seeks-enforcement-labor-laws-guatemala.  
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Press Release, United Steel Workers, USW Declares Support of U.S. Guatemala Labor 
Rights Case (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/news_articles?id 
=0829. 
 176 CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 20.17(2).  
 177 See INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATIONS OF 
TRADE UNION RIGHTS — GUATEMALA (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/doc 
id/4ea6620bc.html (identifying the increasing number of trade union deaths as trade members 
continue to carry out activities while vulnerable to assassination, attacks, threats, smear 
campaigns, infiltration, and the like from Guatemala’s de facto power groups despite formal 
protections written in the law). 
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are not subject to the same treatment as commercial disputes, as this reduces 
their potential effectiveness.178  This lacking should signal the need for better 
recourse in future trade agreements to ensure adequate enforcement of labor 
laws, especially when a lack of enforcement affects trade between the 
parties.179  
B.  Costa Rica 
Another CAFTA-DR action is also pending—this one against Costa Rica.  
In July 2010, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and 
two Costa Rican unions filed a complaint with the Office of Trade and Labor 
Affairs (OTLA).180  The action alleges that the Government of Costa Rica is 
engaged in “serious and repeated failures” to enforce its labor laws in 
violation of CAFTA-DR.181  As of the date of this Article, no action has been 
taken on the complaint by the U.S. government, but the USTR has pledged to 
“make sure that all U.S. workers have the opportunity to compete on a level 
playing field.”182  
V.  UNITED STEEL WORKERS SECTION 301 PETITION AGAINST CHINA 
Early on, the Obama Administration expressed its willingness to work 
with China “to create new opportunities for our workers and our firms to 
compete equally. . . .”183  Slow to rebound from the global economic crisis, 
                                                                                                                   
 178 CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, arts. 20.20–.22 (stating only that arbitration should be 
highly encouraged and not limiting dispute resolution in any other way). 
 179 See infra Part VI. 
 180 Submission to the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, Int’l Longshore & Warehouse 
Union, Coast Longshore Division et al., Complaint Concerning the Failure of the Government 
of Costa Rica to Effectively Enforce Its Labor Laws Under the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (July 20, 2010) [hereinafter ILWU Submission], 
available at http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/07-20-10-IL 
WU-SINTRAJAP-ANEP-DR-CAFTA-Complaint-to-OTLA-Concerning-the-Government-of-C 
osta-Ricas-Failure-to-Follow-its-Labor-Laws-Under-the-ILO.pdf; ILWU Files CAFTA 
Complaint Against the Costa Rican Government, LONGSHORE & SHIPPING NEWS (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/2010/07/ilwu-files-cafta-complaint-against-the-costa-ri 
can-government/.  
 181 ILWU Submission, supra note 180, at 1. 
 182 Allegheny Technologies, supra note 163.  
 183 Hillary Clinton & Timothy Geithner, Op-Ed, A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
with China, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 27, 2009, at 15.  To this end, the editorial concluded with a 
Chinese aphorism: “When you are in a common boat, you need to cross the river peacefully 
together.”  Id.  
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unions in the U.S. continued to look for ways to level the international 
playing field.  The United Steel Workers’ (USW) Section 301 Action against 
China, related to green technology industries,184 took labor to a new level in 
the realm of enforcement of trade rules.  Pursuant to Section 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act, a petition may be filed if a foreign government is (1) denying the 
U.S. its rights under a trade agreement or (2) engaging in unjustifiable, 
unreasonable, or discriminatory acts, policies, or practices that burden or 
restrict U.S. commerce.185  On September 9, 2010, the USW filed a 5,800-
page petition asking the U.S. to take action.186   
The USW asserts that China engages in illegal predatory practices that 
“stimulate and protect its domestic producers of green technology, from wind 
and solar energy products to advanced batteries and energy-efficient 
vehicles,” in violation of WTO rules.187  The petition details five categories 
of problematic green technology policies.188  The first category is 
“restrictions on access to critical materials,” derived from “rare earth 
elements and other minerals” that are critical to green technologies.189  These 
raw materials are essential for use in green technologies, such as “solar 
panels, wind turbines, advanced batteries, [and] energy-efficient 
lighting. . . .”190  This assertion is particularly significant, as China currently 
controls over 95% of the world’s rare earth elements mines.191  In October 
2010, Beijing signaled that it might further decrease exports in 2011, creating 
heightened alarm for China’s trading partners.192  Alarmingly, “[b]y closing 
or nationalizing . . . producers of rare earth metals,” China consolidated its 
control of rare earths in 2011 and drove up prices to the detriment of 
companies producing energy-efficient bulbs and other green energy 
products.193 
                                                                                                                   
 184 Complaint, Petition for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: 
China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technology, Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter USW Green 301 Action], available at http:// 
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/09-09-2010%20Petition.pdf. 
 185 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006). 
 186 USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184; Press Release, United Steel Workers, USW 
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The second category listed in the USW Section 301 Action addresses 
China’s “subsidies that are contingent on export performance or on the use of 
domestic over imported goods.”194  The subsidies, particularly for wind 
turbine manufacturing, allegedly allow China to “freely undercut and outbid 
U.S. exporters of green technology products around the world.”195  The third 
category involves “discrimination against foreign firms and goods” through 
China’s policy of “bid[ding] out the construction of wind farms and solar 
power plants,” granting the winners concessions and the guaranteed right to 
purchase power produced by government-owned utilities.196  The fourth 
category pertains to China’s laws requiring the transfer of advanced 
technology in foreign venture agreements, which are subject to government 
approval.197  According to the USW petition, as a practical matter, “foreign 
firms’ investment agreements with state-owned partners or state financiers 
invariably contain requirements to transfer technology,” in violation of 
China’s commitment to the WTO that it will not “require that foreign 
companies transfer technology as a condition of investment approvals.”198  
This so-called “technology for market” strategy199 is drawing criticism from 
corporations such as GE and Siemens AG.200  
Lastly, the petition alleges that China is engaged in a broad range of 
“trade-distorting domestic subsidies.”201  As an example, the USW cites 
China’s stimulus package containing more than “$216 billion to subsidize 
green technologies.”202  The USW asked the U.S. to take action pursuant to 
Section 301 to enforce the rights of the U.S. pursuant to WTO rules,203 
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and 
China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO.204  The petition concludes by 
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 194 USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184, at 3.  
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 197 Id. at 4.  
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stating that “these policies have given Chinese producers an upper hand in 
accessing investment, technology, raw materials, and markets, while denying 
these same opportunities to U.S. producers.”205 
On September 28, 2010, 181 Members of Congress sent a letter to 
President Obama supporting the USW petition and expressing their concern 
about China’s practices related to green technology.206  Just days later, forty-
three members of the Senate sent a similar letter to President Obama, in 
“strong support” of the USN 301 Petition, urging him to take “immediate and 
aggressive action.”207  On October 15, 2010, USTR Kirk announced that he 
was commencing a formal investigation into the allegations.208  USTR Kirk 
further asserted that to the extent that any allegations are supported by 
sufficient evidence, the U.S. would “vigorously pursue the 
enforcement . . . through WTO litigation.”209  China called the move 
“baseless and irresponsible,” adding that “[i]t is sending a wrong signal of 
trade protectionism to the rest of the world.”210  The move was met with 
immediate praise from the USW, claiming “President Obama showed 
again . . . that fighting for U.S. workers and their jobs is his top priority.”211  
Lest there be any doubt about the USW’s efforts to send a strong signal 
about the importance of labor and its influence on trade during the mid-term 
elections, USW President Leo Gerard released an emphatic reminder that 
“[a]s the election approaches, voters should ask every candidate whether they 
support a trade policy that creates jobs and wealth here at home . . . .”212 
The U.S. then requested consultations with China under WTO dispute 
settlement provisions concerning a program known as the “Special Fund for 
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 206 Letter from Sander Levine et al., U.S. Member of Congress, to Barack Obama, U.S. President 
(Sept. 28, 2010), available at  http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/letter_president.pdf. 
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Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment.”213  This is one of the issues 
raised by the USW 301 Petition.214  In support of the request, USTR Kirk 
stated: “These subsidies effectively operate as a barrier to U.S. exports to 
China . . . . Our decision . . . underscores our commitment to ensuring a level 
playing field with China for American workers and businesses.”215  The 
European Union and Japan joined the consultations in January 2011.216  In a 
victory for the USW and the U.S., China ended its Special Fund for 
Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment.217 
Although the U.S. has not yet requested WTO consultations on the other 
issues raised in the USW 301 Petition, it may decide to pursue the first issue 
regarding rare earths.  World prices doubled in the first four months of 2011, 
with the reason pointing directly at “China’s chokehold on the market.”218  
China recently established environmental standards governing the production 
of rare earth minerals, claiming that the measures are necessary to ensure the 
“sector’s sustainable development.”219  China could attempt to argue against 
a WTO action by asserting that it qualifies for an environmental protection 
exception to WTO rules banning export restrictions to enable it to conserve 
its natural resources.220  To do so, however, it would need to demonstrate that 
it is restricting consumption of its own industries.221  Speculation is that the 
U.S. is unlikely to challenge China’s rare earth export restraints until 
resolution of a similar WTO challenge by the U.S. against China on raw 
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Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
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materials export restraints.222  In April 2011, the WTO ruled against China223 
and in July the WTO held that China “violated global rules by restricting 
exports of nine raw materials used in the manufacturing of high technology 
products.”224  In so doing, the WTO “rejected China’s argument that its 
restrictions were motivated by a desire to protect the environment and 
prevent a critical shortage of the materials.”225  Significantly, this decision 
paves the way for a challenge to China’s restrictions on rare earth metals.  
VI.  “EXPANDING THE ENFORCEMENT PLAYBOOK”: THREE NEW FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS  
After considering the context for the protection of labor rights in trade 
agreements, this Part reviews the labor provisions in the recently ratified free 
trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama.  All three agreements 
were negotiated and signed by the Bush Administration, and the Obama 
Administration engaged in the process of refining those agreements before 
sending them to Congress for approval.226  Although he made significant 
efforts, President Bush was unable to secure enough support for the 
agreements before leaving office.  After a significant amount of negotiation 
both at home and abroad, the Obama Administration was able to secure 
ratification of the three agreements.227  
The most vocal opposition to these three free trade agreements was from 
labor advocates who argued that the labor provisions in free trade agreements 
were not adequate to protect workers.228  Pursuant to the Trade Promotion 
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Authority (TPA), “principal negotiating objectives” must be met for specific 
issues, including labor.229  Specifically, parties to free trade agreements with 
the U.S. were required  
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United 
States does not fail to effectively enforce its . . . labor laws, 
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in 
a manner affecting trade between the United States and that 
party after entry into force of a trade agreement between those 
countries; 
 (B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the 
right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, 
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make 
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement 
with respect to other labor or environmental matters 
determined to have higher priorities, and to recognize that a 
country is effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or 
inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or 
results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of 
resources, and no retaliation may be authorized based on the 
exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic labor 
standards . . . ;  
 (C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading 
partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as defined 
in section 3813(6) of this title).230 
The TPA defined “core labor standards” to mean:  
(A) the right of association; 
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labor; 
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; 
and 
                                                                                                                   
Protection in Free Trade Agreements, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 385, 386 (2011) (noting labor 
advocates strong objections to the South Korean free trade agreement). 
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(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational 
safety and health.231 
This attempt to incorporate labor standards into trade agreements was an 
overture to labor groups, yet it did not require trading partners to undertake 
more substantial protections for workers.  In 2005, Congress ratified 
CAFTA-DR by a very narrow margin, barely overcoming labor concerns.232  
This led to A New Trade Policy for America or Bipartisan Agreement on 
Trade Policy (Bipartisan Agreement) between the Bush Administration and 
congressional leaders in 2007, aiming to elevate labor requirements in trade 
agreements.233  
In accordance with the Bipartisan Agreement, free trade agreements must 
include a template of four enforceable labor commitments.234  First, trading 
partners are required to make an enforceable commitment to  
adopt and maintain in their laws and practice the five basic 
internationally-recognized labor principles, [articulated] in the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work:  
 
• Freedom of association;  
• The effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining;  
• The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labor;  
• The effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on 
the worst forms of child labor; and  
• The elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.235 
                                                                                                                   
 231 Id. § 3813(6)(A)–(E). 
 232 Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. as Trade Pact Wins by 2 Votes, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A1.  
 233 STAFF OF WAYS & MEANS COMM., POSITION PAPER,  A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR AMERICA 
(2007), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/enewsletter/5-11-07/07%2005%20 
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TRADE FACTS: LABOR (2007) [hereinafter BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR], available at http:// 
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file627_11284.pdf. 
 234 BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR, supra note 233, at 1; MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 4 (2008).  
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Second, the countries must agree to enforce effectively their labor laws 
and not to lower their labor standards.236  Third, the agreement sets new 
limits on “ ‘prosecutorial’ and ‘enforcement’ discretion—FTA countries 
cannot defend the failure to enforce laws related to the five basic standards 
due to resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement 
issues.”237  A violation of these standards requires “showing that non-
enforcement of labor obligations occurred through a sustained or recurring 
course of action or inaction.”238  Lastly, labor obligations are subject to the 
same dispute mechanisms and penalties as commercial obligations, with 
fines and trade sanctions available as remedies assessed based on the amount 
of trade injury.239  To be actionable, a violation “must occur in a manner 
affecting trade or investment between the parties,” and “[o]nly a government 
can invoke dispute settlement against [another] government for a labor 
violation” under a free trade agreement.240  This prevents unions and 
businesses from commencing a dispute proceeding against a member 
country.  
The Teamsters’ response to that last requirement in the Bipartisan 
Agreement was mixed.241  Although the Teamsters were pleased that the 
“negotiations have resulted in enforceable labor and environmental chapters, 
including making core International Labor Organization standards 
enforceable,” they contended that this “ ‘deal’ is NO DEAL for the 
Teamsters or American workers, and [that they would] fight like hell to 
oppose this shortsighted agreement.”242  The Korea, Colombia, and Panama 
trade agreements were all negotiated under the TPA and the more rigorous 
requirements of the Bipartisan Agreement.243 
                                                                                                                   
 235 BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR, supra note 233, at 1; see generally INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, 
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 241 Press Release, Jim Hoffa, Gen. President, Teamsters, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Oppose 
Trade Deal That Sells Out American Workers (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.teams 
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USTR Kirk has vowed to “expan[d] [the] enforcement playbook.”244  
Although it is unclear what he means, as is discussed below, labor concerns 
resulted in additional negotiations of the Korea and Panama agreements.245  
Unions continue to call for increased protections for workers—both domestic 
and international—as well as increased enforcement mechanisms in the 
pending free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and Korea.246  
Currently, all three agreements contain provisions stronger than CAFTA-
DR,247 yet they still fall far short of what labor advocates deem acceptable to 
protect American jobs.248  In fact, in a June 15, 2011 letter to the members of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters asserts that “[a]ll three [trade] agreements are modeled after the 
job-killing [NAFTA].”249  The Teamsters however, overlook that, unlike the 
labor provisions in NAFTA, the ones in the Korea, Colombia, and Panama 
trade agreements are in the main body of the agreement—not merely in a 
side agreement—and are fully enforceable.250  The Teamsters also claim that 
the free trade agreements will “result in job losses” and “will further exploit 
workers and deny basic human rights.”251  A few days after Teamsters’ letter, 
on June 20, 2011, the USW expressed vocal opposition to the pending Korea, 
Colombia, and Panama agreements in a letter to all of the members of the 
House and the Senate.252  The USW opposed the trade agreements because of 
                                                                                                                   
 244 Allegheny Technologies, supra note 163. 
 245 Id. at 17.  
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FTA, supra note 247, and Panama FTA, supra note 247. 
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its foundation on the “failed NAFTA model” and “because they do not 
adequately address the changing nature of trade and accelerating 
globalization.”253  The Teamsters and USW, however, did not suggest actual 
provisions to strengthen the agreements.  Moreover, they ignore the fact that 
the trade agreements contain four enforceable labor concepts, as agreed upon 
in the Bipartisan Agreement, that significantly increase worker 
protections.254  
At the end of June 2011, the Senate Finance Committee scheduled 
informal, or “mock,” markups of the three pending trade agreements, 
including the inclusion of the TAA in the implementing bill.255  Ultimately, 
in October 2011, the three agreements were ratified.256  
A.  United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement  
“The United States and the Republic of Korea signed the United States-
Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) on June 30, 2007,” with 
Congress approving it in October 2011.257  A significant reason why this 
agreement remained pending for over four years was opposition from labor 
groups, particularly that related to the automotive trade.258  The Obama 
Administration have every incentive to address labor opposition because of 
                                                                                                                   
 253 Id. 
 254 See infra Parts V.A–C.  
 255 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative Ron 
Kirk Welcomes Next Steps on Pending Trade Pacts, Trade Adjustment Assistance (June 28, 
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 256 Kirk on Congressional Passage, supra note 20.  
 257 U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under the 
U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr. 
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited May 4, 2012) [hereinafter 
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restructuring and preserving the domestic automakers.”).  
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the high stakes for the U.S. with this agreement, which is expected to add 
“around $10 billion to annual merchandise exports to Korea.”259 
Initial concerns voiced by labor groups are contained in the Labor 
Advisory Committee’s (LAC) April 2007 report on KORUS FTA.260  The 
LAC report was highly critical of KORUS FTA, stating that “[the 
agreement] will not protect the fundamental human rights of workers in 
either the United States or Korea.”261  The report’s primary objection was 
that KORUS FTA contained “essentially the same flawed labor chapter 
found in [CAFTA-DR].”262  Specifically, KORUS FTA (1) did not “contain 
enforceable provisions requiring that the government meet its obligations 
under the ILO core labor standards”; (2) did not “prevent Korea from 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws to 
encourage trade or investment”; (3) did not “require that Korea effectively 
enforce its own laws with respect to employment discrimination”; (4) 
“cap[ped] the maximum fine at $15 million”; and (5) required “the violating 
country pa[y] the fine to a joint commission to improve labor rights 
enforcement, [with] the fine end[ing] up back in [the violating country’s] 
own territory.”263  All of these criticisms were, understandably, an echo of 
those that nearly prevented the approval of CAFTA-DR.264  
The May 2007 Bipartisan Agreement, however, largely addressed these 
concerns.265  In its final form, the Labor Chapter of KORUS FTA (Article 
19)266 incorporates the key template requirements outlined in the Bipartisan 
Agreements.267  Specifically, each Party to KORUS FTA must “adopt and 
maintain” the five fundamental principles in the ILO Declaration;268 
“[n]either Party shall fail to effectively enforce its labor laws”;269 “[n]either 
Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from” its obligations regarding the 
                                                                                                                   
 259 New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under the U.S. Korea Trade Agreement, supra 
note 257. 
 260 THE U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: REPORT OF THE LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
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 265 See supra Part V (discussing the requirements of the Bipartisan Agreement).  
 266 KORUS FTA, supra note 247, art. 19. 
 267 BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR, supra note 233. 
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 269 Id. art. 19.3(1)(a). 
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ILO fundamental principles;270 and “[e]ach Party “shall provide that parties 
to such proceedings may seek remedies to ensure the enforcement of their 
rights under its labor laws.”271  It is important to note that “[t]o establish a 
violation of [the Labor Chapter] a Party must demonstrate that the other 
Party has failed to adopt or maintain a statute, regulation, or practice in a 
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties.”272  If there is a 
violation of Article 19, the aggrieved Party may seek labor consultations and, 
if that is not successful, dispute resolution as provided for in Article 22, 
Institutional Provisions and Dispute Settlement.273  
Despite these changes, opposition from labor and other groups persisted.  
In September 2010, over 550 groups ranging from family farm, labor, and 
manufacturing groups to consumer groups sent a letter to President Obama 
opposing KORUS FTA.274  Specifically citing the inadequacy of the Labor 
Chapter, the groups describe the KORUS FTA as a “throwback to a failed 
trade policy,” stating that they “oppose more of these same job-killing, 
community destroying trade policies.”275  The letter asserts that KORUS 
FTA “includes the Bush administration’s explicit ban on reference to the 
International Labor Organization’s core Conventions.”276  It is important to 
note, however, that the Labor Chapter in KORUS refers explicitly to 
compulsory obligations related to the ILO Declaration.277  The Obama 
Administration then undertook “an unprecedented level of input from 
stakeholders, including industry and labor” in connection with additional 
negotiations with Korea.278 
After a series of meetings during the fall of 2010,279 the U.S. and South 
Korea reached a landmark agreement addressing concerns raised by U.S. 
autoworkers.280  The terms of the agreement include a number of provisions 
                                                                                                                   
 270 Id. art. 19.2(2). 
 271 Id. art. 19.4(3). 
 272 Id. art. 19.2(1) n.2. 
 273 Id. arts. 19.7, 22. 
 274 Letter from Citizens Trade Campaign to Barack Obama, U.S. President (Sept. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.canadians.org/tradeblog/?p=1104. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 KORUS FTA, supra note 247, art. 19.2(1). 
 278 2011 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 43, at 3.  
 279 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Sewell Chan, U.S. and South Korea Fail to Agree on Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, at A17; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-
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ss-office/press-releases/2010/october/us-korea-trade-discussions-update. 
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to give the U.S. auto industry breathing room to compete with auto imports 
from Korea and to make plans to export autos to Korea.  For example, the 
agreement now allows the U.S. a five-year phase out (as opposed to 
immediate lifting) of the 2.5% tariff on cars imported from Korea and a 25% 
U.S. tariff on imported Korean trucks would remain in place for seven years, 
with a reduction to 0% by year ten.281  Korea also agreed to cut its tariff on 
autos imported from the U.S. in half, to 4%, and to cut immediately a 10% 
tariff on trucks imported from the U.S.282  This agreement made KORUS 
FTA much more attractive to the automotive industry, which feared an 
inability to compete with Korean imports without such a tariff agreement.283 
Similar to the issues with the Chinese tire tariffs, the agreement resulted 
in a divided opinion among labor.  Two powerful unions, both focusing on 
the potential for exports to Korea, immediately supported the deal—the 
United Automobile Workers and the United Food and Consumer Workers 
(meat exports).284  In contrast, the International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers (IAM) issued a strongly worded statement in 
opposition, asserting that the agreement “fails to make any improvements on 
the inadequate Bush labor standards.”285  Likewise, the AFL-CIO and USW 
opposed the new provisions, making blanket statements that the agreement 
still lacks adequate provisions to protect American workers.286  Neither union 
offered any specifics about what provisions they would like to see 
included.287  
An updated LAC report reflected this relief and praised President 
Obama’s decision to renegotiate aspects of KORUS FTA to “seek a better 
deal for U.S. auto assembly workers.”288  Although the LAC report expressed 
some concerns, such as that some of the trade safeguards might not be useful 
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in practice and that the special dispute resolution procedures do not allow 
participation by nongovernmental interested persons (e.g., unions), the report 
supports the supplemental agreement overall.289 
B.  United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement  
As soon as the U.S. reached the agreement with Korea, the U.S. 
intensified its engagement with Colombia and Panama with the goal of 
resolving differences to bring all three agreements to Congress.290  The 
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia FTA) was 
signed on November 22, 2006.291  Following the Bipartisan Agreement, the 
Colombia FTA was amended to reflect the new requirements, including 
those regarding labor.292  Specifically, the “key amendments include 
obligations related to five basic ILO labor rights,” which would be fully 
enforceable through the dispute settlement mechanism.293  “[T]he Colombian 
Senate ‘overwhelmingly’ approved” the agreement on October 30, 2007,294 
and its Constitutional Court completed its review in July 2008, concluding 
that the Agreement conforms to Colombia’s Constitution.295  
The labor provisions in the main text of the agreement strengthened 
worker protections.  Prior to the Bipartisan Agreement, the Colombia FTA 
“only required the signatories to strive to ensure that their domestic laws 
would provide for labor standards consistent with internationally recognized 
labor principles.”296  The initial LAC report was very critical, stating that 
“[t]he labor provisions of the Colombia FTA . . . will not protect the 
fundamental human rights of workers in either country.”297  The report was 
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particularly critical in noting that the “complete lack of effective measures is 
particularly troubling given the well-documented violations of trade union 
rights in Colombia, up to and including the torture and murder of trade 
unionists by state actors or paramilitary groups that enjoy, at the very least, 
the tacit support of the military.”298 
In its final form,299 the Colombia FTA contains enforceable provisions 
very similar to those in KORUS FTA.  The Labor Chapter (Article 17) 
specifically incorporates the key “template” requirements: each Party must 
“adopt and maintain” the five fundamental principles in the ILO 
Declaration;300 “[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor 
laws”;301 “[n]either Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from” its 
obligations with the fundamental rights set forth in the agreement;302 and 
“[e]ach party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest in a 
particular matter have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of 
the Party’s labor laws.”303  It is important to note that “[t]o establish a 
violation of [Article 17 regarding fundamental rights,] a Party must 
demonstrate that the other Party has failed to adopt or maintain a statute, 
regulation, or practice in a manner affecting trade or investment between the 
Parties.”304  If there is a violation of Chapter 17, the aggrieved Party may 
seek labor consultations and, if that is not successful, dispute resolution as 
provided for in Chapter 21 (Dispute Settlement).305  Importantly, the “[l]abor 
obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement, enforcement 
mechanisms, and criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as other 
obligations under the trade agreement.”306 
Significant tariff reductions make the Colombia FTA attractive to 
business.  For example, market access would be significantly improved for 
U.S. exporters to Colombia.  
The agreement would provide for the elimination of tariffs on 
bilateral trade in eligible goods.  Colombia’s average tariff on 
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U.S. goods is 12.5% while the average U.S. tariff on 
Colombian goods is 3%.  Colombia applies tariffs in the 0%–
5% range on range on [sic] capital goods, industrial goods, and 
raw materials; 10% on manufactured goods with some 
exceptions; and 15% to 20% on consumer and “sensitive” 
goods.  Upon implementation, the agreement would eliminate 
80% of duties on U.S. exports of consumer and industrial 
products to Colombia.  An additional 7% of U.S. exports would 
receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation 
and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years 
after implementation.307 
Despite these economic benefits, however, ongoing concerns about 
violence in Colombia against labor advocates and the lack of protection of 
internationally recognized labor rights has prevented the Colombia FTA 
from gaining support in the U.S.308  Major U.S. trade unions, including the 
AFL-CIO, Teamsters, United Auto Workers, and USW, expressed their 
opposition to the revised agreement in a letter to Congress.309  Citing the 
“ongoing high rates of violence against trade unionists and continuing 
impunity for the perpetrators of that violence,” they urged “for a 
reconfiguration of U.S. policy towards Colombia” to avoid “promoting a 
race to the bottom in terms of wages, working conditions, and respect for the 
basic rights of workers.”310  
There have been ongoing reports of violence and other egregious acts 
against workers in Colombia.311  According to one report, forty-six unionists 
were murdered in Colombia, and, over the last twenty-five years, 2,850 trade 
unionists have been murdered there.312  Another significant labor issue in 
Colombia is the use of Associative Labor Cooperatives (Cooperatives), a 
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situation in which workers are hired through subcontractors.313  According to 
the Washington Office on Latin America, the use of Cooperatives 
“undermines worker protections and labor rights,” especially in certain 
sectors, such as the sugar industry.314  As USTR Kirk emphasized, “these 
issues go to our core U.S. values and interests, such as the protection of labor 
rights. . . . We will not sign agreements just for agreements’ sake.  They must 
be enforceable and of the highest standard and in the interests of America’s 
workers, farmers, businesses and entrepreneurs.”315 
In an effort to address these serious issues head-on, trade negotiators 
worked with the Colombian government to develop the Colombian Action 
Plan Related to Labor Rights (Action Plan).316  The Action Plan 
memorializes Colombia’s agreement to take action to “protect internationally 
recognized labor rights, prevent violence against labor leaders, and prosecute 
perpetrators of such violence.”317  Pursuant to the Action Plan, Colombia 
agrees to take action by creating a specialized Labor Ministry to implement 
and enforce labor rights; hiring 480 new labor inspectors over a four-year 
period, with 100 to be hired during this year; reforming the Criminal Code 
by establishing penalties for employers that undermine the right to bargain 
collectively; amending the law to prevent the misuse of workers in 
Cooperatives; implementing a regime to prevent the use of temporary service 
agencies to circumvent labor rights; amending the Criminal Code to make it 
a crime to use collective pacts to undermine the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; and developing protection programs for union activists and 
criminal justice reform to support prosecutions involving union members and 
activists.318  The Action Plan contains concrete steps to be undertaken to 
address the serious shortcomings in each of these areas.319  
Reaction to the Action Plan has been mixed.  The U.S. Labor Education 
in the Americas Project criticized the agreement as inadequate because it 
 (1) does not require an actual reduction in violence against 
trade unionists or advances on impunity, (2) is limited only to 
                                                                                                                   
 313 Workers Without Rights: Labor Activists in Valle del Cauca’s Sugar Sector Under Fire, 
WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM. (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.wola.org/workers_without_rights. 
 314 Id. (alleging that by subcontracting labor to third parties, companies are able to avoid 
their labor obligations under Colombian law). 
 315 February 2011 Kirk Testimony, supra note 290.  
 316 COLOMBIAN ACTION PLAN RELATED TO LABOR RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2787. 
 317 Id. at 1. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
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labor issues and does not address a wide range of other 
concerns, including human rights violations, militarization, 
impact on agriculture, internal displacement and the rights of 
Afro-Colombians, and (3) provides no way to ensure 
compliance once the Colombia FTA is implemented.  
Consequently, prominent labor and human rights groups have 
joined leading Colombian trade union organizations in 
denouncing the agreement as woefully inadequate as a 
sufficient condition for approval of the FTA.320 
Expressing concern about the lack of union involvement in the Action Plan 
and the potential lack of enforcement, the Colombian Unitary Confederation 
of Workers and the Colombian Confederation of Workers issued a joint 
declaration opposing the Action Plan and the trade agreement.321  In contrast, 
the Action Plan and the Colombian Trade Agreement is supported by two 
other major Colombian labor unions—the General Labor Confederation and 
the Union of Workers in the Apparel and Textile Industries of Colombia.322  
Colombia’s National Labor School also endorsed the Action Plan.323  In the 
U.S., the USW and Teamsters continue to oppose the Colombia Trade 
Agreement, expressing concern about ongoing violence and the need to make 
sure that the Action Plan is fully implemented and enforced.324  Underscoring 
the immediacy of the problems in Colombia and the urgency of concerns, a 
Colombian labor rights lawyer who represented sugarcane workers was left 
in critical condition after an assassination attempt.325  This incident prompted 
                                                                                                                   
 320 Obama’s “Labor Action Plan” for Colombia Woefully Inadequate; Doesn’t Require 
Reduction in Violence, U.S. LAB. EDUC. AMERICAS PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.usleap. 
org/obama%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Clabor-action-plan%E2%80%9D-colombia-woefully-ina 
dequate-doesn%E2%80%99t-require-reduction-violence.  
 321 Berta Joubert-Ceci, Two Sides of U.S. Latin America Policy: Colombia and Ecuador, 
WORKERS WORLD (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.workers.org/2011/world/latin_america_0421/.  
 322 COLOMBIAN ACTION PLAN: COLOMBIAN LABOR UNIONS, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE COAL. 
(May 20, 2011), http://www.latradecoalition.org/files/2010/12/Colombian-Unions-on-the-Actio 
n-Plan-May-31-2011.pdf.  
 323 Id. 
 324 USW Joins Colombia Unions in Opposition to Proposed FTA, UNITED STEEL WORKERS 
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.usw.org/media_center/news_articles?id=0750; Teamsters Question 
Colombia Human and Labor Rights Action Plan’s Scope, Impact, TEAMSTERS NEWS (Apr. 7, 
2011), http://www.teamster.org/content/teamsters-question-scope-impact-colombia-action-plan. 
 325 Colombian Labor Rights Lawyer in Critical Condition After Assassination Attempt, 
WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM. (May 16, 2011), http://www.wola.org/publications/Colombian_l 
abor_rights_lawyer_in_critical_condition_after_assassination_attempt. 
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lawmakers to reexamine the timing of the Colombia FTA until there is 
“ ‘tangible evidence’ that workers’ rights are being protected.”326 
Against this backdrop, just a little more than two months after the Action 
Plan was memorialized, USTR Kirk announced that Colombia “met the 
milestones slated for completion by June 15, 2011.”327  The significant steps 
taken by Colombia to comply with the Action Plan include:  
 • Secur[ing] legislation establishing a separate Labor 
Ministry to provide better institutional capacity to protect labor 
rights . . . [and] legislation to establish criminal penalties, 
including imprisonment, for employers that undermine the 
right to organize and bargain collectively or threaten workers 
who exercise their labor rights.  The law includes a provision 
making it a crime to offer a collective pact to non-union 
workers that has superior terms to those offered to union 
workers. 
 • Accelerat[ing] the effective date from July 2013 to June 
2011 of new legal provisions, including significant fines, to 
prohibit and sanction the misuse of cooperatives and other 
employment relationships that undermine workers’ rights. 
 • Issu[ing] regulations that implement these new legal 
provisions on cooperatives and other employment 
relationships, clarify earlier cooperatives laws, and ensure 
coherence among these laws.  The regulations include 
significant fines for companies that violate these laws and 
create tools for the Government to promote the establishment 
and maintenance of direct employment relationships between 
the user companies and affected workers.  The new regulations 
also strengthen and clarify rules to ensure that only legitimate, 
autonomous, and self-directed cooperatives are allowed to 
operate. . . . 
 • [Strengthening] the government protection program for 
threatened union activists, [by] reduc[ing] by 75 percent the 
                                                                                                                   
 326 Mike Lillis, Dems Question Colombia Trade Pact After Shooting of Activist Labor 
Lawyer, HILL (May 18, 2011), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/161981-senior-house-dems 
-question-colombia-trade-pact-after-shooting-of-activist-labor-lawyer-. 
 327 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Colombia Meets June 15th 
Milestones Under Action Plan on Labor Rights (June 13, 2011), available at http://www.ustr. 
gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/colombia-meets-june-15th-milestones-un der-
action-plan. 
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backlog of risk assessments for those unionists applying for 
protection. 
 • Issu[ing] internal guidance to prosecutors to accelerate 
action on labor violence cases with leads, including a special 
focus on the priority labor cases identified by Colombian labor 
unions as well as labor violence cases from recent years. 
 • Develop[ing] a plan to strengthen the capacity and number 
of prosecutors and judicial police investigators in regional 
offices of the Prosecutor General. . . . 
 • [Beginning the hiring of] 100 additional labor inspectors 
and budget[ing] for the hiring of 100 more labor inspectors in 
2012, as part of a commitment to double the labor inspectorate 
by hiring 480 new labor inspectors over the next four years. 
 • Assign[ing] 50 of these new labor inspectorate positions 
exclusively to cases involving cooperatives, and 35 of the 
remaining 50 new positions to address abuses of workers’ 
rights in the priority sectors of palm oil, sugar, mines, ports, 
and flowers. . . .  
 • Establish[ing] a robust enforcement regime to detect and 
prosecute the use of collective pacts to undermine the right to 
organize and bargain collectively, including through preventive 
inspections of all companies in which both union-negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements and collective pacts are 
present. . . . 
 • Expand[ing] the scope of the existing government 
protection program for union leaders to also provide protection 
for labor activists (such as shop stewards and bargaining 
committee members), workers who are trying to organize or 
join a union, and former union activists who may be threatened 
because of their past activities on behalf of workers.328 
Despite the fact that Colombia was given until December 15, 2011 to 
complete most of the remaining obligations under the Action Plan,329 the 
Colombia FTA was ratified in October 2011.330  At this point, it is unclear if 
Colombia fulfilled its remaining obligations.  Unfortunately, because the 
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 330 US Congress Ratifies Colombia FTA, COLOMBIA REPORTS (Oct. 12, 2011), http://colombia 
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Action Plan is a side agreement, not a mandatory obligation under the main 
trade agreement, it will be difficult to enforce any unfulfilled obligations if 
the requirements exceed Colombia’s responsibilities under Labor Chapter 
17.331  
C.  United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement 
Compared to the issues surrounding the KORUS FTA and Colombia FTA 
agreements, the Panama Free Trade Agreement (Panama FTA) was much 
less controversial.  The U.S. and Panama signed the agreement on June 28, 
2007, and Panama approved the agreement shortly thereafter on July 11, 
2007.332  The same labor and other issues affecting KORUS FTA and the 
Colombia FTA agreements delayed Panama FTA until the entire package of 
agreements was presented for ratification.333  
As was the case with KORUS FTA and Colombia FTA, the LAC report 
was written before the May 10th Bipartisan Agreement labor provisions were 
added to the Panama FTA.334  The major criticisms, such as the lack of 
enforceable provisions regarding ILO obligations, the fear of “weakening or 
reducing the protections,” and the lack of a requirement that Panama 
“effectively enforce its own laws” were obviated by the inclusion of 
significant protections provided for in the Bipartisan Agreement.335  In terms 
of actual labor problems in Panama, the LAC report notes problems for 
temporary employees in the retail industry regarding discharge; limitations 
on the freedom of association; denial of the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; improper limitations on the right to strike; denial of workers’ 
rights in the Canal Zone; limitations on the rights of public sector employees; 
problems with trafficking women for forced labor; and unenforced minimum 
age for the employment of children.336  Although these are all issues that 
need to be resolved, they are nowhere nearly as problematic as the labor 
issues and violence in Colombia.  
                                                                                                                   
 331 H.R. REP. NO. 112-237, at 40–46 (2001). 
 332 Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http:// 
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa (last visited May 21, 2012). 
 333 J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32540, THE U.S.-PANAMA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT 1 (2011).  
 334 THE U.S.-PANAMA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY 1 (2007), http://ustraderep.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreem 
ents/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file696_11235.pdf. 
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 336 Id. at 6–13.  
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In its final form, the Panama FTA contains enforceable provisions very 
similar to those in KORUS FTA and the Colombia FTA.  The Labor Chapter 
(Article 17) specifically incorporates the key “template” requirements: each 
Party must “adopt and maintain” the five fundamental principles in the ILO 
Declaration;337 “[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor 
laws”;338 “[n]either Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from” its 
obligations with the fundamental rights set forth in the agreement;339 and 
“[e]ach Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest in a 
particular matter have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of 
the Party’s labor laws.”340  It is important to note that, “[t]o establish a 
violation of [Article 17 regarding fundamental rights] a Party must 
demonstrate that the other Party has failed to adopt or maintain a statute, 
regulation, or practice in a manner affecting trade or investment between the 
Parties.”341  If there is a violation of Article 17, the aggrieved Party may seek 
labor consultations and, if that is not in successful dispute resolution as 
provided for in Chapter 20, Dispute Settlement.342  Importantly, the labor 
obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement, enforcement 
mechanisms, and criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as other 
obligations under the trade agreement.343 
VII.  THE FUTURE: LABOR AND TRADE  
 But are we so sure that globalization is here to stay?  That 
economic internationalization carries in its wake the eclipse of 
national politics? . . . We should by now have learned that 
politics remains national, even if economics does not.344 
This quote captures the essence of the struggle between labor and trade: 
labor is very political at home, but the reality is that we live in a global 
                                                                                                                   
 337 Colombia FTA, supra note 247, art. 17.2(1). 
 338 Id. art. 17.3(1)(a). 
 339 Id. art. 17.2(2). 
 340 Id. art. 17.4(1). 
 341 Id. art. 17.2(1) n.2. 
 342 Id. art. 17. 
 343 See generally Labor in the U.S-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement: Protecting and 
Enhancing Labor Rights, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ 
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economy.  Americans need to understand that the job landscape is changing.  
If the vision of Labor Secretary Solis is that the Department of Labor works 
to create “ ‘Good Jobs for Everyone’ ” and that “[f]ostering fair working 
conditions in the global marketplace is one of the Department’s five key 
goals,”345 then trade policy should continue to incorporate domestic and 
international worker concerns.  This policy needs to help workers adjust to 
different opportunities and also offer them protection from unfair 
competition.  What the U.S. should not do, however, is to engage in 
isolationist practices to insulate workers from competing worldwide.  
This trade strategy will require distinguishing between hyperbolic rhetoric 
and concrete concerns.  For example, with regard to the trucking dispute with 
Mexico, unions had substantial concerns about the safety of Mexican trucks 
when NAFTA went into effect.  The Teamsters Union and other affected 
U.S. workers had every right to speak out, demanding the trucks from 
Mexico meet the same standards as U.S. trucks.  The March 2011 plan, 
however, contains a rigorous set of requirements with which Mexican trucks 
must comply.  It is disingenuous now for labor to mount general opposition 
to the plan.  If the plan is insufficient, then specific recommendations, 
instead of sweeping general anti-trade statements should be offered to 
strengthen the measures.  
The situations involving Chinese tires and the USW Section 301 petition 
on green technology raise other issues.  By placing tariffs on certain tires 
imported from China, the Obama Administration helped one group of 
workers and secured the support of some labor groups.  This, however, was 
at the expense of consumers and other workers.  While there may have been 
short-term political gains, the long-term effect may be detrimental; 
unnecessarily damaging trade relations with China.  In contrast, the USW 
301 Petition makes very effective use of an established trade remedy.  With 
regard to the Special Fund for Wind Power Technology, it appears that 
pursuing WTO action was justified to level the playing field.  It may also be 
the case that the U.S. should pursue action on rare earth elements.  In this 
case, labor—the USW—is playing an important role, calling into question 
problematic practices.  Accordingly, labor can play a significant and useful 
role in affecting trade policy, but it must be based on facts that show an 
undermining of fair trade.  
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With regard to trade agreements, the shortcomings of labor protections in 
CAFTA-DR are abundantly clear.  This is illustrated by the ongoing attempt 
to address systematic labor problems in Guatemala.  The labor provisions in 
the newest free trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama reflect 
a significant improvement, yet they fall short.  The U.S. should continue to 
seize the opportunity to implement measures in trade agreements that are 
designed to influence labor practices in other countries.346  Future trade 
agreements should continue to include commitment to all of the elements 
agreed to in the May 10, 2007, Bipartisan Agreement summarized as 
follows,  
(1) Commitment by the U.S. and its trading partners to 
adopt and maintain in domestic law the five 
fundamental labor rights as stated in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work: 
▪ Freedom of association, as well as the right to 
form and join a union; 
▪ The right to collective bargaining; 
▪ Elimination of all forms of compulsory or 
forced labor; 
▪ Effective abolition of child labor and a 
prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; 
and 
▪ Elimination of employment and occupation 
discrimination based on gender, race, or other 
factors. 
(2) Commitment not to waive or otherwise fail to apply 
labor laws in a manner affecting trade and 
investment. 
(3) Commitment to effectively enforce fundamental labor 
rights, as well as wage and hour and occupational 
safety and health laws. 
(4) Commitment to establish procedures that allow 
members of the public to raise concerns about labor 
violations directly with either of the two 
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governments, which must be reviewed and 
considered. 
(5) Commitment to guarantee workers and employers 
access to tribunals where rights can be enforced and 
to ensure that proceedings before those tribunals are 
fair, equitable, and transparent. 
(6) Commitment to improve labor standards and to 
cooperate on a wide range of labor issues, including 
labor relations, labor inspection, employment 
opportunities and working conditions. 
(7) Commitment to the same level of dispute settlement 
accountability for meeting labor obligations as for 
meeting commercial obligations.  Available remedies 
for violations of labor commitments will include trade 
sanctions and fines.347 
With regard to the ILO obligations, the U.S. needs to review its own laws 
to ensure that it is fully compliant with its obligations.  Although the U.S. has 
laws in place related to each of the fundamental principles, it has not ratified 
all of the ILO’s conventions related to each.  As illustrated by the following 
chart, as of July 1, 2011, the U.S. had only ratified two of the eight 
conventions:348  
 
CONVENTION NAME U.S. RATIFICATION 
#87 Freedom of Assoc. (1948) -- 
#98 Right to Organize (1949) -- 
#29 Forced Labor (1930) -- 
#105 Abolition of Forced Labor (1957) 1991 
#138 Child Labor (1973) -- 
#182 Elim. Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999) 1999 
#100 Equal Remuneration (1951) -- 
#111 Discrimination (1958) -- 
 
Moreover, to the extent that the goal is to increase workers’ rights and 
level the international playing field, it would be useful to build on this 
foundation and incorporate additional provisions.  For example, to the extent 
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that a party’s laws are inconsistent with their ILO obligations, benchmarks, 
similar to the provisions in the Cambodia Textile Agreement,349  should be 
set with a schedule of changes that need to be made with free trade benefits 
tied to a clear and relatively short phase-in of those changes. 350  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Whether they want to or not, workers in the U.S. must compete globally.  
As President Obama stated:  
Rather than fear the future, we must embrace it.  I have no 
doubt that America can compete—and succeed—in the twenty-
first century.  And I know as well that more than anything else, 
success will depend not on our government, but on the 
dynamism, determination, and innovation of the American 
people.351 
As the international workforce shifts, programs such as the TAA are 
essential to help workers transition into other positions.  As illustrated by the 
trade disputes involving Chinese tires and China’s Special Fund for Wind 
Power Manufacturing, remedies are available under existing trade law to 
prevent the U.S. from being subjected to unfair competition.  Although some 
of the agreements the U.S. has entered into in the past failed to fully protect 
workers, new agreements incorporate much more robust provisions.  As 
noted in the recommendations, there is always room for improvement as the 
U.S. moves forward negotiating agreements with other trading partners.  
Hopefully, labor will continue to play a responsible role in trade, avoiding 
protectionist bravado and promoting rights for workers worldwide. 
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